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DOUBLE DAMAGES OR NOTHING:
WHETHER MEDICARE ADVANTAGE
ORGANIZATIONS HAVE A PRIVATE CAUSE
OF ACTION UNDER THE MEDICARE
SECONDARY PAYER ACT
JENNIFER A. PREVETE†
INTRODUCTION
Mrs. Aidan is a sixty-seven-year-old woman who suffers from
Type 2 diabetes.1 She took the drug Avandia, manufactured and
distributed by the company GlaxoSmithKline, L.L.C. (“GSK”), for
a year before suffering a stroke related to its consumption. She
amassed substantial medical costs during her hospitalization and
treatment. Under the Medicare Secondary Payer Act (“MSP
Act”), GSK is responsible as a primary payer to cover the cost of
Mrs. Aidan’s medical treatment.2
Assume Mrs. Aidan is a Medicare enrollee. Under the MSP
Act, if GSK fails to make its required payments for Mrs. Aidan,
the government may cover her medical expenses by making a
conditional payment.3
As the term “conditional” connotes,
Medicare pays with the stipulation that GSK, the responsible
primary payer, will reimburse Medicare.4 If GSK does not repay
the government within sixty days of Medicare’s final demand, the
MSP Act empowers the government to bring an action in federal
court and to recover not only the conditional payment, but twice
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1
The facts from this hypothetical are adapted, in part, from In re Avandia
Mktg., Sales Practices & Prods. Liab. Litig., 685 F.3d 353, 355 (3d Cir. 2012).
2
See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395y(b)(2)(B)(ii) (West 2014).
3
See id. § 1395y(b)(2)(B)(i).
4
See id. § 1395y(b)(2)(B)(ii).
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that amount.5 Thus, if Medicare makes a $50,000 conditional
payment, the government may potentially recover $100,000 from
GSK. The government has this right regardless of whether there
is a judgment against GSK or a settlement between GSK and
Mrs. Aidan.6
In an effort to stem the rising costs of health insurance, the
MSP Act conditioned the government’s payments for Medicare
enrollees upon repayment from private insurers.7
The
government’s right of recovery is extensive; the Act allows the
government to recover double the amount of damages calculated
for the beneficiary.8 Amendments expanded the right even
further, permitting the government to recover from alleged
tortfeasors, such as GSK in the hypothetical.9 Imagine if the
government’s rights, described in Mrs. Aidan’s case, were also
available to Medicare Advantage Organizations (“MAOs”).
Established under the Medicare Act, MAOs are private insurers
that cover an additional thirteen million beneficiaries in the
United States.10
For every one of these thirteen million
beneficiaries who suffers an injury requiring medical costs, the
MAO would have the ability to sue primary payers—including
product-producing corporations—for double damages.11 The costs
would severely affect corporations’ willingness to settle with
injured beneficiaries.
This Note proposes that the United States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit’s interpretation of the MSP Act, extending a
private cause of action to private insurers, will have negative
effects on mass tort litigation. The Medicare statute’s text and
5

See id. § 1395y(b)(2)(B)(iii).
See id. § 1395y(b)(2)(B)(ii) (“A primary plan’s responsibility for such payment
may be demonstrated by a judgment, a payment conditioned upon the recipient’s
compromise, waiver, or release (whether or not there is a determination or
admission of liability) of payment . . . included in a claim against the primary
plan . . . .”).
7
See id. § 1395y(b)(2)(B)(i).
8
See id. § 1395y(b)(2)(B)(iii).
9
See id. § 1395y(b)(2)(A)(ii), 1395y(b)(2)(B)(iii); see also infra Part I.C.2.
10
Marsha Gold et al., Medicare Advantage 2012 Data Spotlight: Enrollment
Market Update, KAISER FAM. FOUND. 1 (2012), https://kaiserfamilyfound
ation.files.wordpress.com/2013/01/8323.pdf.
11
See § 1395y(b)(2)(B)(iii); Amaris Elliott-Engel, Cert Denial in Subrogation
Case Could Complicate Mass Torts, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Apr. 16, 2013,
http://www.law.com/jsp/pa/PubArticlePA.jsp?id=1202596050820,
available
at
http://www.advance.lexis.com (search “Cert Denial in Subrogation Case”; then scroll
down and select “Legal News” hyperlink).
6
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legislative history do not definitively answer who should benefit
from the private cause of action. However, since the liable
parties may be held responsible for payment even after settling
with the plaintiffs, the potential of having to pay double damages
will discourage such parties from settling. Ultimately, the
insured parties will have less compensation for their injuries.
Part I of this Note outlines the history and purpose of the
Medicare statute, Medicare Advantage, and the MSP Act. The
MSP Act dictates that insured individuals pursue coverage from
“primary plans” while Medicare makes conditional payments
with the agreement that the primary plans will reimburse the
costs.12
Part II provides the MSP Act’s spectrum of
interpretations and why the United States Circuit Courts of
Appeals have read the private cause of action with varying
expansiveness. Part III concludes that the private cause of
action should not be extended to MAOs, asserting that the
extension ultimately results in harm to the injured insured and
inefficiency in mass tort litigation and settlement. Despite the
worthy goal of reducing the cost of healthcare coverage, providing
private insurers with a new federal remedy and entitlement to
double damages is an undesirable and inefficient solution.
I.
A.

HISTORY AND PURPOSE

History and Purpose of the Medicare Statute

Medicare is a federally conducted and federally funded
health insurance program available to individuals age sixty-five
and over, individuals who are permanently disabled under the
Social Security Act, and individuals with end-stage renal
disease.13
While the push for a government solution to
healthcare began decades earlier, Medicare was born from the
ideal of social insurance during President Franklin Delano

12

§ 1395y(b)(2)(A).
Woody R. Clermont, A Brief Introduction to Medicare and the Office of
Medicare Hearings and Appeals, 5 PITT. J. ENVTL. PUB. HEALTH L. 103, 103 (2011)
(citing 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395rr (West 2014); 42 C.F.R. § 441.40 (2015)).
13
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Roosevelt’s New Deal.14 In 1965, President Johnson signed the
Social Security Amendments creating Medicare.15 The program
focused on providing benefits for the elderly.16
The Medicare Act consists of several parts. Part A refers to
the hospital insurance program, covering “inpatient hospital
care, skilled-nursing facility care, hospice care and home health
care.”17 Part B is the supplementary medical insurance program,
which includes physician services,18 outpatient rehabilitation and
hospital diagnostic services, outpatient physical therapy,
occupational therapy, and speech pathology, among others.19
Part C refers to a beneficiary’s choice of Medicare benefits
through Medicare Advantage (“MA”) plans.20 Part D provides a
voluntary prescription drug benefit program for enrollees in Part
A, Part B, and MA.21 Over time, the Act has been amended to
accommodate growing costs and the need for coverage for
prescription drugs.22 The statute’s complicated nature continues
to pose problems of statutory interpretation and efficiency.23
B.

The Creation of Medicare Advantage Organizations

In 1997, Part C allowed for the creation of health plans
covered by private insurers, shifting costs away from the
government.24
Originally known as Medicare+Choice, the
program was renamed Medicare Advantage in 2003.25 Under
Part C, private insurers may establish “MAOs” that provide

14
Rick Swedloff, Can’t Settle, Can’t Sue: How Congress Stole Tort Remedies
from Medicare Beneficiaries, 41 AKRON L. REV. 557, 565–66 (2008).
15
Clermont, supra note 13, at 104.
16
Swedloff, supra note 14, at 570.
17
Clermont, supra note 13, at 109 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1395d (2012)). Part A also
provides some coverage for other areas, such as up to ninety days of hospital care
per illness occurrence, skilled nursing-facility care, home health care services, and
hospice care. Id. at 109–10 (citations omitted).
18
Id. at 112.
19
Id. at 111–12.
20
Id. at 113.
21
Id. at 114.
22
Swedloff, supra note 14, at 570–71.
23
See In re Avandia Mktg., Sales Practices & Prods. Liab. Litig., 685 F.3d 353,
365 (3d Cir. 2012) (“[T]he Medicare Act has been described as among ‘the most
completely impenetrable texts within human experience.’ ”) (quoting Cooper Univ.
Hosp. v. Sebelius, 636 F.3d 44, 45 (3d Cir. 2010)).
24
Clermont, supra note 13, at 105.
25
Id. at 113.
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Medicare beneficiaries with an alternative method of coverage.26
Beneficiaries enrolling in one of these programs will receive the
same benefits under Parts A and B, but the MA alternative
avoids placing additional costs upon Medicare.27
MA plans exist under a contract or policy arrangement and
must comply with both state and federal requirements.28
Medicare pays the MA plan per registered individual, but if
healthcare costs exceed the annual funds, the MA plan bears the
loss.29 If the MA plan’s overall cost of providing coverage to its
members is less than the annual funds Medicare provides, the
MA plan may keep those profits.30 Although there are various
types of MA organizations, all MA plans must provide enrollees
with coverage that encompasses the services guaranteed under
the original Medicare program.31 As of March 2012, thirteen
million beneficiaries were enrolled in MA plans, comprising
twenty-seven percent of the Medicare population.32 These figures
present a ten percent increase from the preceding year.33
For the purposes of this Note, the most crucial difference
between Medicare and Medicare Advantage emerges from the
Medicare Secondary Payer Act. While each plan option allows
for certain benefits and payment schemes for its respective
enrollees, the MSP Act affects recovery and reimbursement in
lawsuits.34 Damages from a potential lawsuit may not be a
primary concern for beneficiaries at the time of selecting
enrollment; however, the various circuit courts’ interpretations of
the MSP Act raises questions for an injured insured’s settlement
abilities.

26
Two Federal Courts Say MA Plans Can’t Use MSP Act To Recover Proceeds,
COORDINATION BENEFITS HANDBOOK NEWSL. (Thompson Publ’g Grp., Inc.), Oct.
2011 [hereinafter MA Plans Can’t Use MSP Act To Recover Proceeds].
27
Id.
28
Clermont, supra note 13, at 113.
29
MA Plans Can’t Use MSP Act To Recover Proceeds, supra note 26.
30
Id.
31
Clermont, supra note 13, at 113–14. MA plans do not have to provide hospice
services but must offer a type of prescription drug plan available under Part D and
may offer supplemental benefits. Id. at 114.
32
Gold et al., supra note 10.
33
Id.
34
See Swedloff, supra note 14, at 560–61.
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Congress created the MSP Act as one potential solution to
reduce some of Medicare’s growing costs.35 In 1980, the creation
of the MSP Act shifted Medicare’s liability for providing primary
coverage to enrollees.36 Before, Medicare served as the primary
payer, or the payer of first resort, for injured enrollees.37 Now,
under the MSP Act, private sources of primary coverage—such as
workers’ compensation, automobile insurers, liability insurers,
and no-fault insurers—cover a Medicare beneficiary’s claims.38
Thus Medicare, as a secondary payer, makes payments for the
beneficiary conditioned on reimbursement from the liable third
party’s insurance provider.39 Congress intended to reduce its
Medicare expenditures by shifting the cost of its enrollees from
the publicly funded Medicare program to these private payers.40
To be successful, the MSP Act requires a governmental
method of enforcement. Consequently, after Medicare makes
conditional payments, the Act empowers the government to bring
a direct action against the primary payer or any person or entity
that has received payments from the primary insurer.41
Medicare’s right of reimbursement is both immediate and
expansive.
A case’s resolution encompasses settlement,
judgment, or award; thus, any of these conclusions to a claim
automatically triggers Medicare’s right to reimbursement.42
35
Matthew Garretson, Medicare Liens—The Basics of the Medicare Secondary
Provider (MSP) Statute, in HANDLING MOTOR VEHICLE ACCIDENT CASES 2D § 6B:2
(John W. Chandler ed., 2015). Risings costs are attributable to the “volume of
services” provided to enrollees as the services steadily increased in complexity and
intensity from 1965 and onwards. Swedloff, supra note 14, at 572–73 (internal
quotation marks omitted).
36
Swedloff, supra note 14, at 574.
37
Id.
38
Id.; see also 42 C.F.R. § 411.24 (2015).
39
Garretson, supra note 35.
40
Swedloff, supra note 14, at 575.
41
Garretson, supra note 35. If there is a settlement, the government can seek
recovery from the settling beneficiary, the attorneys that receive contingency
payments from the settlement, and the settling defendant. Swedloff, supra note 14,
at 586.
42
42 U.S.C.A. § 1395y(b)(2)(B)(ii)
(West
2014)
(“A
primary
plan’s
responsibility . . . may be demonstrated by a judgment, a payment conditioned upon
the recipient’s compromise, waiver, or release (whether or not there is a
determination or admission of liability) . . . .”); see also Adam Stirrup,
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Furthermore, the statute permits the government to recover
double the amount of damages from the primary insurer that
fails to reimburse Medicare.43
2.

Expansion of Primary Payers

The 2003 amendment to the MSP Act expanded the
government’s potential sources for revenue in an unprecedented
fashion.44 From the outset of the Act, the government could
recover from those entities that are clearly within the insurance
industry.45 However, an ambiguity arose concerning the statute’s
term “primary plan.”46 Prior to 2003, the government engaged in
a series of lawsuits to recover from alleged tortfeasors, such as
large corporations, that had settled with Medicare beneficiaries.47
The government asserted its theory that the defendants were
“self-insured entities” under the MSP Act.48
In one of these lawsuits, Mason v. American Tobacco Co.,49
Medicare recipients asserted a right to recover from defendant
companies that manufactured products causing tobacco-related
illnesses.50
The plaintiffs argued that under the statute,
“defendants should have been the primary payers for the health
care services needed to treat certain tobacco-related illnesses of
Medicare beneficiaries.”51 As an issue of statutory interpretation,
the Second Circuit Court of Appeals reviewed whether the
tobacco companies could be considered “self-insured,” “primary”
plans under 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(b)(2)(A) because, in corporate
form, these companies carried their own risk and shifted liability
The court rejected this
to the corporations themselves.52
Understanding the Medicare Secondary Payer Act, MONDAQ, http://www.mondaq.co
m/unitedstates/x/162988/Healthcare+Food+Drugs+Law/Understanding+The+Medica
re+Secondary+Payer+Act (last updated Feb. 1, 2012).
43
See Swedloff, supra note 14, at 578; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395y(b)(2)(A),
1395y(b)(2)(B)(iii).
44
Swedloff, supra note 14, at 579–80.
45
Id. at 578.
46
Id.
47
See, e.g., Mason v. Am. Tobacco Co., 346 F.3d 36, 43 (2d Cir. 2003); United
States v. Phillip Morris Inc., 116 F. Supp. 2d 131, 145–46 (D.D.C. 2000); Thompson
v. Goetzmann, 337 F.3d 489, 492 (5th Cir. 2003) (per curiam).
48
Swedloff, supra note 14, at 580.
49
346 F.3d 36.
50
Id. at 37–38.
51
Id. at 38 (internal quotation mark omitted).
52
Id. at 39–40 (internal quotation marks omitted); 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395y(b)(2)(A)
(West 2014).

FINAL_PREVETE

242

10/7/2015 7:12 PM

ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 89:235

argument, claiming, “The obvious problem with this approach is
that it turns every corporation into an insurance company subject
to suit under the MSP statute.”53 Thus, the government failed in
its attempts to pursue corporate tortfeasors as primary payers.54
In direct response to the government’s failed litigation,
Congress passed the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement,
and Modernization Act of 2003.55 The Medicare Reform Act
within the amendment overturned the courts’ decisions and
allowed Medicare to recover from alleged tortfeasors.56 The
amendment provides:
[T]he term “primary plan” means . . . a workmen’s compensation
law or plan, an automobile or liability insurance policy or plan
(including a self-insured plan) or no fault insurance, to the
extent that clause (ii) applies. An entity that engages in a
business, trade, or profession shall be deemed to have a selfinsured plan if it carries its own risk (whether by a failure to
obtain insurance, or otherwise) in whole or in part.57

Thus, large corporations became considered “self-insured
plans” and subject to primary payer responsibilities under the
statute.58 In a settlement of a tort action, when a beneficiary
agrees to compromise, waive, or release any claims against the
defendant tortfeasor, the defendant assumes responsibility for
any conditional payments.59 In mass tort cases, especially those
involving product liability, the expanded definition of
“self-insured plan” creates a host of new primary payers who may
also be subject to the government’s right to recover double
damages.60

53
Mason, 346 F.3d at 40. The District Court for the District of Columbia also
firmly rejected the government’s position: “[I]t is clear that Congress did not intend
MSP to be used as an across-the-board procedural vehicle for suing tortfeasors,
which is precisely how the Government attempts to use the statute in this case.”
United States v. Phillip Morris Inc., 116 F. Supp. 2d 131, 135.
54
See, e.g., Mason, 346 F.3d at 43.
55
Garretson, supra note 35.
56
42 U.S.C.A. § 1395y(b)(2)(A)(ii); Garretson, supra note 35.
57
§ 1395y(b)(2)(A)(ii) (emphasis added).
58
Garretson, supra note 35.
59
Swedloff, supra note 14, at 584 (“It is hard to imagine a settlement agreement
that would not include such a waiver and release of claims.”). The government may
recover double damages from these primary payers when they fail to reimburse
Medicare within sixty days, regardless of whether the defendant has already
reimbursed the beneficiary. See id. at 585; 42 C.F.R. § 411.24(h) (2015).
60
See 42 U.S.C.A § 1395y(b)(2)(B)(iii).
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The Private Cause of Action Under
42 U.S.C. § 1395y(b)(3)(A)

In 1986, Congress added a “private cause of action” to assist
recovery from insurers under the MSP Act.61 The text provides:
“There is established a private cause of action for damages
(which shall be in an amount double the amount otherwise
provided) in the case of a primary plan which fails to provide for
primary payment (or appropriate reimbursement) . . . .”62
Cognizant of Congress’s concern with Medicare costs, some courts
suggest that the private right of action allows the
beneficiaries—who may be more aware than the government as
to what entity is responsible as a primary payer—to use the
threat of double damages to motivate a “recalcitrant insurer” to
reimburse Medicare expenses.63 Furthermore, an award of
double damages allows the beneficiary to not only pay back the
government, but also to retain a personal “reward . . . for his
efforts.”64 Accordingly, a beneficiary may exercise the same
recovery rights as the government if the insurer fails to pay.65
Thus, the private parties help enforce Medicare’s rights to
recover from conditional payments by pursuing the money owed
from the primary payers themselves.66
Because of the 2003 amendment, beneficiaries may pursue a
cause of action under the MSP Act in addition to any state law
tort claims.67 Therefore, entities face twice the exposure for
liability.68 Under the MSP Act, the right to recover exists when a
claim is resolved through settlement, judgment, or award,69
meaning that alleged tortfeasors may be liable for double
damages without ever going to trial.70 Although beneficiaries
61

Richard Neuworth & Kevin I. Goldberg, The MSP Act’s Hidden Remedy,
Aug. 2009, at 38, 38.
62
42 U.S.C.A. § 1395y(b)(3)(A); see id. §§ 1395y(b)(1), 1395y(b)(2)(A) (referring
to the provisions establishing Medicare as a secondary payer).
63
Stalley v. Catholic Health Initiatives, 509 F.3d 517, 524–25 (8th Cir. 2007).
64
Id. at 525.
65
Id. at 523–25. The beneficiary may exercise this right whether the
government has paid or not. Id. at 525.
66
Neuworth & Goldberg, supra note 61 (citing Stalley, 509 F.3d at 524–25).
67
Id. at 39.
68
Id. at 39–40.
69
See supra Part I.C.1.
70
Neuworth & Goldberg, supra note 61, at 39–40. “The MSP creates a
disincentive to settle because a defendant is automatically liable if it settles—that is,
it has no defense to the Secretary’s claim for reimbursement . . . .” Swedloff, supra
TRIAL,
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may ultimately succeed in recovering from tortfeasors,
defendants “must be concerned about the outcome of each of the
individual cases in a mass tort, both in terms of actual precedent
and creating a norm for settlement.”71 If defendants know that
they will be facing multiple claims, regardless of whether or not
they settle, then they will be less likely to settle in hopes of being
able to limit liability at trial.72
Recovery of Medicare payments from private insurers has
expanded drastically. Today, liability extends to almost any
public and private entity that negligently causes injuries
incurring medical expenses.73 Courts have accepted this recovery
method for Medicare payments as applied to the government and
Medicare beneficiaries.
However, before 2012, no circuit
accepted a further application to private insurer MAOs. With
the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit’s
decision in In re Avandia Marketing, Sales Practices & Products
Liability Litigation,74 courts and alleged tortfeasors face
extensive and additional claims for double damages from both
MAOs and their enrollees.
II. THE CONFLICTING INTERPRETATIONS OF THE PRIVATE RIGHT
OF ACTION, 42 U.S.C. § 1395Y(B)(3)(A)
A.

The Narrowest View: Only Medicare May Bring Suit Against
Tortfeasors

Looking at the MSP Act’s private cause of action in
conjunction with the 2003 amendment, the Court of Appeals for
the Sixth Circuit has concluded that only Medicare has a federal
cause of action against tortfeasors.75 In two particular cases,

note 14, at 606. Similarly, alleged tortfeasors would have no defense to any parties
exercising the private right of action under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395y(b)(3)(A) (West 2014).
71
Swedloff, supra note 14, at 597–98.
72
Id. at 598. Judge Weinstein observed: “Settlement of mass tort litigations for
personal injuries have [sic] become extraordinarily complex and difficult as a result
of the attempts by the United States to collect on Medicare liens . . . .” Id. (quoting In
re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 451 F. Supp. 2d 458, 461 (E.D.N.Y. 2006)) (internal
quotation mark omitted).
73
Neuworth & Goldberg, supra note 61, at 40.
74
685 F.3d 353 (3d Cir. 2012).
75
See Bio-Med. Applications of Tenn., Inc. v. Cent. States Se. & Sw. Areas
Health & Welfare Fund, 656 F.3d 277, 294 (6th Cir. 2011), cert. dismissed, 132 S. Ct.
1087 (2012); Care Choices HMO v. Engstrom, 330 F.3d 786, 791 (6th Cir. 2003).
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Care Choices HMO v. Engstrom76 and Bio-Medical Applications of
Tennessee v. Central States Southeast & Southwest Areas Health
& Welfare Fund,77 the court looked to the legislative history
surrounding the various provisions in question. While these
cases did not involve suits by MAOs, the Sixth Circuit rejected a
private party’s right to sue putative tortfeasors for double
damages.78
Prior to MA’s creation, in Care Choices HMO, the Sixth
Circuit addressed some of the issues surrounding the private
cause of action. The plaintiff, Care Choices HMO, sued to
recover medical expenses it had paid under the relevant
statutory provision.79
Prior to Medicare Part C, Medicare
“Health Maintenance Organizations” (“HMOs”) contracted with
the Center for Medicare & Medicaid Service (“CMS”) to provide
Medicare services on a “risk” or “cost” basis.80 Licensed by the
CMS to provide replacement Medicare coverage, Care Choices
claimed that its authorizing statute provided an implied private
right of action; therefore, Care Choices could sue and recover
health care expenses after the defendant’s liability carrier paid a
settlement award for a slip-and-fall incident in the defendant’s
supermarket.81
Care Choices looked to the HMO “right to charge provision,”
42 U.S.C. § 1395mm(e)(4), which by its plain language
establishes an HMO’s right to reimbursement where a
beneficiary is eligible for coverage under another insurance
policy.82 However, the court had to determine if the statute
created an affirmative statutory right, enforceable in federal
court.83 The statute provides: “Notwithstanding any other
provision of law, the eligible organization may . . . charge or
76

330 F.3d at 789.
656 F.3d at 289–90.
78
Bio-Medical, 656 F.3d at 292–93; Care Choices HMO, 330 F.3d at 790.
79
42 U.S.C.A. § 1395mm(e)(4) (West 2014); Care Choices HMO, 330 F.3d at
787–88.
80
D. Gary Reed, Medicare Advantage Preempts New York Anti-Subrogation
Law, Three New Decisions Hold, HEALTH LAW., Aug. 2013, at 20, 21 (2013).
81
Care Choices HMO, 330 F.3d at 787–88.
82
Id. at 789; see also Eileen Kuo, Medicare Advantage as Secondary Payer:
Efforts by MAOs To Seek Reimbursement Under the Medicare Secondary Payer
Law—Private Cause of Action—Confusion Between the Old and the New with
Medicare and Managed Care, in HEALTH L. HANDBOOK § 12:5 (Alice G. Gosfield ed.,
2013).
83
Id.
77
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authorize the provider of such services to charge” either the
“insurance carrier, employer, or other entity” legally obligated to
pay for the services or its member, if the member had already
been reimbursed for the services.84 In its analysis, the court
looked to legislative history as well as comparisons with the MSP
Act.85
The court contrasted this HMO “right to charge” provision
with the mandatory language of the MSP Act, which conditioned
Medicare payments on reimbursement from a primary payer.86
Upon comparing the MSP Act’s language—“ ‘shall’ be
conditioned”—with the permissive word “may” found in the HMO
provision, the court held that HMOs did not have as extensive
rights as Medicare.87 The court reasoned that the MSP provision
applied strictly to Medicare while Congress intentionally failed to
provide an express remedy for HMOs in § 1395mm.88 The court
emphasized that § 1395y(b) governs Medicare as a secondary
payer, not any other insurer providing substitute Medicare
coverage.89
The court went beyond the text to distinguish the two
statutes based on the MSP Act’s legislative history and policy.
Specifically, there is a traditional, alternative method of recovery
for Medicare-substitutes: contractual remedies in state court.90
According to this interpretation, private insurers have the ability
to include specific provisions within their policy plans.91 If
private insurers, including HMOs and other MA plans, desire
subrogation rights and the ability to pursue reimbursements in
court, then they should include such a provision within their
insurance policies.92 The court claimed that this remedy, “based
on a standard insurance contract claim and not on any federal
statutory right,” was a “widely recognized alternative avenue for

84

42 U.S.C.A. § 1395mm(e)(4).
Care Choices HMO, 330 F.3d at 789–90.
86
Id. at 790; see also Kuo, supra note 82.
87
Care Choices HMO, 330 F.3d at 790 (internal quotation marks omitted); see
also 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395y(b)(2)(B)(i); id. § 1395mm(e)(4).
88
Care Choices HMO, 330 F.3d at 790.
89
Id. at 789–90 (noting that § 1395mm(e)(4) did not provide Medicaresubstitute HMOs with “affirmative rights to reimbursement” while “Congress
subsequently amended § 1395y to include an express right of recovery”).
90
See id. at 790; Kuo, supra note 82.
91
Care Choices HMO, 330 F.3d at 789; Reed, supra note 80, at 22.
92
Care Choices HMO, 330 F.3d at 790; Reed, supra note 80, at 22.
85
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enforcement.”93 With this reasonable alternative for insurers to
recover, the court saw no reason to infer that private insurers
possessed a federal right to sue.94
In a later decision, the Sixth Circuit examined whether the
2003 amendment classifying putative tortfeasors as primary
payers would also allow a private party to recover double
damages from defendant tortfeasors under the MSP Act’s private
cause of action.95 In Bio-Medical, the plaintiff Bio-Medical, a
specialized treatment center, provided kidney dialysis treatment
to a patient for about one year.96 The patient assigned her rights
under her insurance plan from Central States to Bio-Medical.97
Central States initially covered the costs of the insured patient’s
treatment; however, the coverage ceased after the patient was
diagnosed with end-stage renal disease.98 Bio-Medical sought
reimbursement under the MSP Act’s private cause of action,
alleging that Central States—as a primary plan—failed to make
payments after the patient’s diagnosis of end-stage renal disease,
which made her eligible for Medicare benefits.99
Central States attempted to avoid liability under the 2003
amendment involving suits against tortfeasors under the private
cause of action.100 With the 2003 amendment, Congress also
added the “demonstrated responsibility” provision, which
provides that a primary plan shall reimburse Medicare “if it is

93

Care Choices HMO, 330 F.3d at 790.
Id. Other courts have applied this holding to contemporary MAOs. In a New
York case, the court found that MAOs did not have a “statutory right of
reimbursement” but only “ ‘statutory permission’ to include recovery provisions in
their contracts.” See Kuo, supra note 82 (citing Ferlazzo v. 18th Ave. Hardware, Inc.,
33 Misc. 3d 421, 426, 929 N.Y.S.2d 690, 693–94 (Sup. Ct. Kings Cnty. 2011)).
95
Bio-Med. Applications of Tenn., Inc. v. Cent. States Se. & Sw. Areas Health &
Welfare Fund, 656 F.3d 277, 279 (6th Cir. 2011), cert. dismissed, 132 S. Ct. 1087
(2012).
96
Id. at 280.
97
Id.
98
Id. End-stage renal disease is one of the conditions leading to Medicare
coverage. See Clermont, supra note 13; 42 U.S.C. § 426-1(a)(2) (2012),
42 U.S.C.A. § 1395rr(a) (West 2014). The patient’s insurance plan with Central
States explicitly provided that coverage would cease upon entitlement to Medicare.
Bio-Medical, 656 F.3d at 280.
99
Id. at 285. By the time the patient died, Bio-Medical had an outstanding
balance of approximately $210,000 and had received an undisclosed amount from
Medicare. Id. at 280.
100
Id. at 290.
94
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demonstrated that such primary plan has or had a responsibility
to make payment with respect to such item or service.”101 It
further provides:
A primary plan’s responsibility for such payment may be
demonstrated by a judgment, a payment conditioned upon the
recipient’s compromise, waiver, or release (whether or not there
is a determination or admission of liability) of payment for
items or services included in a claim against the primary plan
or the primary plan’s insured, or by other means.102

Although Central States attempted to avoid liability under
this provision, the court noted several issues raised by prior case
law:
(1) The demonstrated responsibility provision, several
paragraphs away from the private cause of action provision, had
been read to limit the private cause of action despite the lack of
any cross-reference, and (2) the provision only explicitly
addresses Medicare, not private parties.103
Based on context and congressional intent, the court found
that the demonstrated responsibility provision limited only
tortfeasor liability, not primary plan liability generally.104
Furthermore, the provision referred solely to Medicare; thus, the
court found that the demonstrated responsibility provision
applied only to suits brought by Medicare.105 Consequently, the
demonstrated responsibility provision did not apply to BioMedical, a private party, against Central States, an entity that
provided insurance coverage but was not a self-insured
tortfeasor.106 The court “believe[d] that when Congress amended
the Act in 2003 to permit lawsuits against tortfeasors and to add
the ‘demonstrated responsibility’ provision, Congress intended to
permit lawsuits against tortfeasors only by Medicare, and not
lawsuits against tortfeasors by private parties.”107 Thus, if a
private party attempted to bring suit against a putative
tortfeasor, the case would be dismissed.

101

42 U.S.C.A. § 1395y(b)(2)(B)(ii) (West 2014); see Bio-Medical, 656 F.3d at

290.
102

§ 1395y(b)(2)(B)(ii).
Bio-Medical, 656 F.3d at 288 (discussing Glover v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 459
F.3d 1304, 1308–09 (11th Cir. 2006)).
104
Id. at 290.
105
Id. at 292.
106
Id. at 293.
107
Id. at 292–93.
103
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In Bio-Medical, the court deferred to the Act’s structure,
noting that Congress placed the “demonstrated responsibility”
provision within a subparagraph governing the relationship
between Medicare and primary plans.108 Consequently, the
reimbursement rights relating to tortfeasor liability did not apply
to private parties.109
Furthermore, the legislative history
surrounding the 2003 amendment did not suggest that the right
of action against tortfeasors was available to private parties.110
First, the MSP Act’s private cause of action does not require
private parties to obtain a judgment before seeking
reimbursement for Medicare’s conditionally made payments.111
Second, Congress enacted the 2003 amendment in direct
response to the cases that denied the government’s recovery
against putative tortfeasors.112 These cases did not involve such
a large extension of recovery rights to private parties.113
Although Care Choices HMO and Bio-Medical did not involve
suits brought by MAOs, the Sixth Circuit’s statements regarding
the private cause of action and the demonstrated responsibility
provision have implications upon how Congress intended the
MSP Act to be applied to Medicare compared to other parties.
While the Sixth Circuit strictly construed the statutory text, the
court also relied on the legislative history surrounding the MSP
Act and the 2003 amendment.114 When the court examined the
textual, legislative, and policy factors working against extending
the right to sue tortfeasors, it ultimately concluded that only
Medicare had the right to bring suit.

108

Id. at 292 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 290–92.
110
Id.
111
Id. at 292; see also supra Part I.C.1.
112
See Mason v. Sebelius, Civ. No. 11-2370 (JBS/KMW), 2012 WL 1019131, at
*7, *9 (D.N.J. Mar. 23, 2012); see also supra Part I.C.2.
113
Bio-Medical, 656 F.3d at 292 (“[T]he predominant legislative backdrop was
Medicare’s (not private parties’) failed attempts to bring lawsuits against
tortfeasors.”).
114
See Care Choices HMO v. Engstrom, 330 F.3d 786, 790–91 (6th Cir. 2003);
Bio-Medical, 656 F.3d at 288–89.
109
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The Middle View: Medicare Beneficiaries May Sue
Tortfeasors Under the MSP Act

Within the last several years, various circuits have
interpreted the MSP Act to provide a private right of action
exclusively to Medicare enrollees. In these cases, the plaintiffs
were not injured beneficiaries but third-party advocates, which
implicates
arguments
about
standing
and
statutory
interpretation.115 Although the private cause of action does not
explicitly establish who may bring suit, the circuits did not find
that the statute conferred an unlimited right to sue.116 In 2007,
the Court of Appeals for the First and Eighth Circuits held that
only Medicare beneficiaries were entitled to invoke the private
right of action under the MSP Act.117 Both courts dismissed on
the same grounds: The MSP Act’s private right of action did not
bestow any plaintiff with the right to sue solely on behalf of the
government.118
In United Seniors Ass’n v. Philip Morris USA,119 a nonprofit
taxpayer advocacy group sued to force five tobacco companies to
reimburse the Medicare program expenditures on medical
treatment for beneficiaries with smoke-related illnesses.120 The
group asserted the right to bring suit under the
42 U.S.C § 1395y(b)(3)(a) private cause of action.121 However, the
plaintiff advocacy group did not allege whether it was suing on
behalf of any of its members or whether any of its members were
Medicare beneficiaries treated for smoking-related illnesses.122
The court found that United Seniors “suing in its capacity as a
nonprofit taxpayer advocacy group to vindicate the fiscal
integrity of the Medicare program”—rather than representing
any particular Medicare beneficiary—“utterly fails to meet [the]
standard” for Article III standing.123 The plaintiffs insisted that
the MSP Act private right of action was a qui tam statute.124 Qui
115
See United Seniors Ass’n v. Philip Morris USA, 500 F.3d 19, 22 (1st Cir.
2007); Stalley v. Catholic Health Initiatives, 509 F.3d 517, 519 (8th Cir. 2007).
116
United Seniors Ass’n, 500 F.3d at 25; Stalley, 509 F.3d at 522.
117
United Seniors Ass’n, 500 F.3d at 23; Stalley, 509 F.3d at 519.
118
United Seniors Ass’n, 500 F.3d at 26; Stalley, 509 F.3d at 527.
119
500 F.3d 19.
120
Id. at 22.
121
Id.
122
Id.
123
Id. at 23.
124
Id.
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tam statutes allow private individuals to sue on behalf of the
federal government in an effort to encourage private aid in
discovering fraud and abuse.125 However, the court looked at the
statutory language and rejected this interpretation.126 Thus, the
MSP Act private cause of action was limited to Medicare
beneficiaries for the purpose of helping the government recover
its conditional payments.
The court noted that although the legislative history is
ambiguous, Congress added the private right of action to reduce
government spending.127 An examination of the text and public
policy convinced the court that this right to recover was limited
to Medicare beneficiaries.128
The First Circuit contrasted
42 U.S.C. § 1395y(b)(3)(A) with true qui tam statutes, such as the
False Claims Act (“FCA”), 31 U.S.C. § 3729.129 As a qui tam
statute, the FCA explicitly authorizes that a “person may bring a
civil action . . . for the person and for the United States” as
opposed to the language of § 1395y(b)(3)(A), which merely
establishes that a private cause of action exists.130
Also,
Congress enacted the causes of action in the FCA and MSP Act
within the same month; thus, Congress intentionally phrased
these two provisions differently and intended to limit the MSP
action.131
The Eighth Circuit, like the First Circuit, concluded that the
MSP Act provided a private right only for Medicare beneficiaries
in association with recovering conditional Medicare payments.132
As in United Seniors, the plaintiff in Stalley v. Catholic Health
Initiatives133 had no personal injury but asserted he had standing
to bring suit under the MSP Act’s private right of action as a qui
125

Id. at 24.
Id. at 25 (“[A]ssuming (as we do) that only Medicare beneficiaries can
prosecute a private § 1395y(b)(3)(A) cause of action . . . their very power to sue
coincidently serves a pro-government purpose: that of discouraging primary insurers
from failing to reimburse Medicare and preventing depletion of the Medicare trust
fund.”).
127
Id. at 21.
128
See id. at 25; Stalley v. Catholic Health Initiatives, 509 F.3d 517, 522 (8th
Cir. 2007).
129
United Seniors Ass’n, 500 F.3d at 24.
130
Compare United Seniors Ass’n, 500 F.3d at 24 (alteration in original)
(quoting 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b) (2012)), with 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395y(b)(3)(A) (West 2014)
(“There is established a private cause of action for damages . . . .”).
131
United Seniors Ass’n, 500 F.3d at 24.
132
Stalley, 509 F.3d at 527.
133
509 F.3d 517.
126
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tam statute.134 Stalley alleged that defendants Catholic Health
Initiatives and Triad Hospitals, Inc., who were partly
self-insured for malpractice, caused harm to Medicare patients at
their hospitals.135 Similar to United Seniors, the court noted that
Stalley neither claimed to be a Medicare beneficiary nor did he
allege any personal injury from defendants.136
Relying on the statute’s plain language, the court noted that
“[t]here is established a private cause of action for damages” as
opposed to a public right, which may be vindicated in qui tam
actions.137 Although the court acknowledged that the private
right of action may share characteristics of a qui tam statute, it
would not confer a qui tam right to sue based on Congress’s
intentions.138 Faced with scant legislative history referring to the
private right, the court looked to case law and found general
agreement that the statute’s purpose is to aid the government’s
recovery of conditional payments.139
Logically, if Congress
contemplated that Medicare beneficiaries would sue to recover
double damages from primary payers, then beneficiaries and
Medicare would be adequately compensated. Consequently, the
statute should not be read to allow plaintiffs to sue in order to
assert “the public’s rights.”140 Similar to the First Circuit, the
Eighth Circuit in Stalley also referenced the FCA, which
contained procedural safeguards for the government to control
the qui tam provision.141 In contrast, the MSP Act had no such
governmental controls, providing strong textual support and
“powerful evidence that Congress did not mean § 1395y(b)(3)(A)

134

Id. at 520.
Id. at 519–20. Stalley pursued the medical care providers as self-insured
primary payer tortfeasors and their insurers as primary payers. Id.
136
Id. at 520.
137
Id. at 522 (quoting 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395y(b)(3)(A) (West 2014)) (internal
quotation mark omitted).
138
Id.
139
Id. at 524 (citing United Seniors Ass’n v. Philip Morris USA, 500 F.3d 19, 21–
22 (1st Cir. 2007); Manning v. Utils. Mut. Ins. Co., 254 F.3d 387, 396–97 & n.8 (2d
Cir. 2001); Harris Corp. v. Humana Health Ins. Co. of Fla., 253 F.3d 598, 606 (11th
Cir. 2001); Frazer v. CNA Ins. Co., 374 F. Supp. 2d 1067, 1077 (N.D. Ala. 2005)).
140
Id. at 527.
141
Id. at 522.
135
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to function as a qui tam statute.”142 Therefore, the MSP Act
private cause of action required private parties to assert their
own injury.143
In Stalley, the court also explored the practical implications
of allowing beneficiaries to sue under the private cause of action:
(1) The beneficiary may have greater awareness than the
government of the entities responsible for payment; (2) the
beneficiary has the incentive of recovering double damages from
the primary payer and payment exceeding original expenses; and
(3) the beneficiary obtains sufficient recovery to reimburse the
government.144
Thus, when Medicare makes conditional
payments, the private cause of action allows Medicare
beneficiaries to recover double damages for themselves with the
ability to repay the government.145 Both the statutes and case
law support the limitation on the private cause of action to
Medicare.
The courts engaged in extensive interpretation
because the statutory text does not explicitly identify Medicare
beneficiaries as private actors; it only establishes that a private
cause of action exists under the Act.146 Legislative history also
fails to clarify who the private actor may be. Nonetheless,
Congress enacted the private cause of action several years prior
to the creation of MA programs.147 Based on these implicit
textual cues as well as policy, the limitations upon the private
right of action garner substantial support.
Based on the courts’ limitation of the action, the MSP Act
allows Medicare beneficiaries to sue to enforce Medicare’s
rights.148 If plaintiffs meet the standing requirements, then they
may sue their primary plan providers to recover Medicare’s
conditional payments.149 With the specific purpose of reducing

142

Id.
Id.
144
Id. at 524–25.
145
Id. at 527.
146
See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395y(b)(3)(A) (West 2014).
147
Congress enacted the MSP Act in 1980 and added the private cause of action
in 1986. See id. § 1395y(b)(3)(A). Congress created the Medicare Advantage program,
then known as the Medicare+Choice program in 1997. See Balanced Budget Act of
1997, Pub. L. No. 105-33, 111 Stat. 251, 275-76 (1997).
148
See Stalley, 509 F.3d at 522–23; United Seniors Ass’n v. Philip Morris USA,
500 F.3d 19, 25 (1st Cir. 2007).
149
Tamela J. White, The Medicare Secondary Payer Act and Section 111 of the
Medicare, Medicaid, Schip Extension Act of 2007: Implications for Claim
143
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government spending, MSP claims are individualized and do not
exist in “mass-tort scenarios.”150 In the hands of a beneficiary,
the double damages recovery is a powerful tool, essentially
“requir[ing] a payer to settle the same medical expense claim
three times.”151 Consequently, specific beneficiaries do not bring
a generalized grievance suit on behalf of a class of commonly
injured Medicare beneficiaries.152 The express purpose of the
private cause of action is to allow Medicare beneficiaries to help
the government recover conditional Medicare payments.153
C.

The Broadest View: The MSP Act Private Cause of Action
Extends to MAOs

While the circuits have debated how expansive the MSP
Act’s private cause of action is regarding Medicare beneficiaries
and putative tortfeasors, the courts have consistently examined
the right in the context of Medicare’s conditional payments.
However, in 2012 the Third Circuit became the first circuit to
hold that the Medicare Secondary Payer Act places no limits on
the private actor that can bring suit to recover double
damages.154 Consequently, MAOs, as secondary payers, may sue
primary payers who fail to reimburse MAOs for conditional
payments.155
The Third Circuit employed the broadest interpretation of
the MSP Act after it consulted both the statutory text and CMS
regulations.156 In In re Avandia Marketing, Sales Practices &
Products Liability Litigation,157 the plaintiff Humana was an
As a private
insurance company that ran a MA plan.158
insurance company created under Medicare Part C, Humana
sued the defendant GlaxoSmithKline (“GSK”) to recover expenses

Management and Resolution for Liability Insurance Plans, 77 DEF. COUNS. J. 180,
186 (2010).
150
Id. at 186–87.
151
Id. at 186.
152
Id. at 186–87. Article III standing requirements must be met: “injury in fact,
causal connection, and injury redress.” Id.
153
Id. at 186.
154
In re Avandia Mktg., Sales Practices & Prods. Liab. Litig., 685 F.3d 353, 365
(3d Cir. 2012).
155
Id. at 367.
156
Id. at 355.
157
685 F.3d 353.
158
Id. at 355.
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incurred for Humana’s treatment of its insureds’ injuries.159 GSK
manufactured and distributed the drug Avandia, which was used
to treat Type 2 diabetes and had been linked to “substantially
increased risk of heart attack and stroke.”160 As a MAO, Humana
insured those enrollees who were injured by taking Avandia.161
The Third Circuit agreed with Humana’s assertion that “the
private cause of action . . . created by the Medicare Secondary
Payer Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(b)(3)(A), provides it and other
MAOs with the right to bring suit.”162 The court noted that the
provision
establishing
MAOs
as
secondary
payers
cross-referenced § 1395y(b)(2), which provides the definitions for
primary payers and secondary payers with regard to the original
Medicare program.163 Based on these definitions, GSK qualified
as a “self-insured plan” because it paid “out of its own pocket to
settle the Avandia-related claims.”164 Thus, GSK was a primary
payer and Humana was a secondary payer.165 The MSP Act only
provides the United States with a cause of action.166 However,
the court then looked to the MSP Act private cause of action to
determine that MAOs also have a cause of action against primary
payers.167
Remarkably, the Third Circuit looked at the same statutory
text as its sister circuits and came to the opposite conclusion
regarding the absence of an established plaintiff in the private
cause of action under § 1395y(b)(3)(A).168 According to the court,
if Congress wanted to limit the private cause of action and make
it unavailable to MAOs then it would have expressly done so,169
as in other provisions of the Medicare Act in which the section
applied only to “part A or part B of this subchapter” and not part

159

Id.
Id.
161
Id.
162
Id. at 357.
163
Id. at 358.
164
Id.
165
Id.
166
See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395y(b)(2)(B)(iii) (West 2014) (“[T]he United States may
bring an action against any or all entities that are or were required or
responsible . . . to make payment with respect to the same item or service (or any
portion thereof) under a primary plan.”).
167
In re Avandia, 685 F.3d at 358–59.
168
Id. at 359.
169
Id. at 359–60.
160
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C.170 A plain reading of the statutory text—“[t]here is established
a private cause of action”171—placed no limitation upon which
private parties may bring suit.172 Thus, the court found any
private party, including MAOs, had a right to sue for
reimbursement from a primary plan.173 Although MAOs did not
exist when Congress created the MSP Act, the court believed that
since Congress was aware of the existence of other private
Medicare providers, such as HMOs, Congress would have
explicitly prevented them from suing under the private cause of
action provision.174
The court believed that the statutory text clearly conferred
MAOs with the right to recover under the MSP Act.175 However,
it also came to the same conclusion under the deference analysis
articulated in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Counsil, Inc.176 The Chevron two-part test allows a federal court
to determine whether or not it will defer to statutory
interpretation found within a federal agency’s regulation when
that agency is charged with implementing the statute in
question.177 According to the test, (1) if congressional intent is
clear, the court must abide by that intent regardless of any
regulations, and (2) if the statute is unclear, “that is, silent or
ambiguous with respect to the specific issue,” then the court will
determine if the agency’s answer through regulations is a
permissible interpretation.178
Specifically, the court referred to CMS’s guidance on
Medicare secondary payer procedures provided in the Code of
Federal Regulations.179 Within 42 C.F.R. § 422.108, states are
prohibited from depriving MA organizations of the rights
170

Id. at 360 (quoting 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395y(a)).
§ 1395y(b)(3)(A).
172
In re Avandia, 685 F.3d at 359.
173
Id.
174
Id. at 360. The court was referring to private insurers such as the HMO seen
in Care Choices HMO v. Engstrom, 330 F.3d 786 (6th Cir. 2003). See supra, Part
II.A.
175
In re Avandia, 685 F.3d at 360.
176
Id. at 365–66.
177
Id. at 366 (citing Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc.
(Chevron), 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984)).
178
Id. (internal quotation mark omitted) (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–44).
The court defers to this permissible regulation as long as it is not “arbitrary,
capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute.” Id. (internal quotation mark
omitted).
179
See id.; 42 C.F.R. § 422.108 (2015).
171
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available to them under “[f]ederal law and the MSP regulations
to bill, or to authorize providers and suppliers to bill, for services
for which Medicare is not the primary payer.”180 It further
provides: “The MA organization will exercise the same rights to
recover from a primary plan, entity, or individual that the
Secretary exercises under the MSP regulations in subparts B
through D of part 411 of this chapter.”181 Thus, the court saw the
regulation as a direct interpretation of the MSP Act and deferred
to congressional intent to treat MAOs in the same manner as
Medicare under the MSP Act.182
The court also found that legislative history and policy
supported its expansive interpretation of the private cause of
action.183 The court referred to Congress’s expressed goal of
curbing the rising costs of Medicare and how Congress intended
to accomplish this goal through enacting the Medicare Advantage
program and the MSP Act.184 MAOs’ ability to use the private
market for innovation and cost reduction would be inhibited if
they could not recover with the same persuasive means that
Medicare employs, including the threat of double damages.185
The Third Circuit followed a somewhat attenuated line of
reasoning; when MA plans spend less and efficiently provide
coverage to enrollees, the Medicare Trust Fund retains twentyfive percent of the savings.186 Consequently, when MAOs recover
from primary payers, they spend less on their enrollees and that
results in cost savings to the Medicare Trust Fund.187 The court
conceded that “the legislative history is nowhere explicit that
MAOs may bring suit for double damages under the MSP private
cause of action or using any other provision.”188 Regardless,
180

§ 422.108(f).
Id.
182
In re Avandia, 685 F.3d at 366–67.
183
Id. at 363.
184
Id.
185
Id. at 363–64.
186
Id. at 365.
187
Id.; see also Eileen Kuo, Medicare Advantage as a Secondary Payer: Efforts by
MAOs To Seek Reimbursement Under the Medicare Secondary Payer Law—Private
Cause of Action—The Third Circuit Finds That MAOs Do Have a Private Cause of
Action Against Primary Payers, in 2013 HEALTH L. HANDBOOK § 12:7 (Alice G.
Gosfield ed., 2013) (“In other words, when MAOs are able to reduce costs by avoiding
payment or collecting reimbursement when MAOs are secondary to a primary payer,
the resulting savings do return to the Medicare Trust Fund and result in reduced
costs for Medicare.”).
188
In re Avandia, 685 F.3d at 364.
181
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Congress intended to reduce the healthcare burden on the
government through the creation of MAOs as a competitive
alternative, and to place MAOs at a “competitive disadvantage”
undermines that goal.189
Those supporting an extension of the private right of action
to MAOs are also concerned with the alleged alternative means
for MAOs to recover conditional payments. Because of the
complexity of the Medicare Act, there is some debate as to how
Medicare Part C plans interact with the federal government and
enrollees.190
MAOs contract with the federal government to
serve as a substitute for benefits provided under Medicare Parts
A and B.191 Therefore, MAOs must comply with the statutory
guidelines and do not issue their own policies or insurance
contracts.192 As a result, these supporters argue that MAOs do
not have the suggested alternative of writing in “subrogation”
rights into their “insurance contracts.”193 Instead, MAOs’ rights
to recovery as secondary payers are purely statutory.194
This interpretation of the private cause of action hinges on
the view that MAOs enjoy the same rights and privileges as the
federal government. It also employs a liberal approach to the
methods that will ensure the ultimate goal of reducing the
government’s costs for healthcare. An expansion of recovery
rights to MAOs does not have the textual and legislative support
as the other interpretations of the private cause of action. The
lack of substantial support and the policy implications of
expanding recovery rights counsel against this broad
interpretation.
III. THE PRIVATE CAUSE OF ACTION UNDER § 1395Y(B)(3)(A)
SHOULD NOT BE CONSTRUED TO ALLOW MAOS TO SUE AND
RECOVER DOUBLE DAMAGES
Based on both the plain language of the MSP Act’s private
cause of action in 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395y(b)(3)(A) and policy
implications, courts should not expand the right to sue and

189

Id. at 363–64.
MA Plans Can’t Use MSP Act To Recover Proceeds, supra note 26.
191
Id.; Kuo, supra note 82.
192
See MA Plans Can’t Use MSP Act To Recover Proceeds, supra note 26; Kuo,
supra note 82.
193
Kuo, supra note 82 (internal quotation marks omitted).
194
Id.
190
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recover double damages from primary payers when Congress did
not extend this right. The Third Circuit in In re Avandia created
a new and extremely lucrative federal cause of action where none
previously existed.195
Without sufficient support from the
statutory text and legislative history, courts should refrain from
allowing MAOs to assert these reimbursement rights until
Congress provides clarification.
A.

Support from Case Law and Statutes for a Limitation on the
Private Cause of Action

Prior to the Third Circuit’s decision in In re Avandia, no
circuit had expanded a federal right to pursue conditional
payments to MAOs. In fact, other circuits limited the private
cause of action as applied to Medicare beneficiaries.196 The courts
gave various reasons to limit recovery under the MSP Act.
Although the statutory text can be ambiguous and confusing,
Congress never explicitly expanded the MSP Act to MAOs.197
Furthermore, when all relevant sections refer explicitly to the
government, courts should not read in an application to MAOs
when legislative history also does not suggest such an
application.
First, the text of the MSP Act establishes Medicare as a
secondary payer, emphasizing the statute’s purpose at its most
basic level: cost-savings and reimbursement for the federal
government.198 Likewise, each following subparagraph identifies
the federal government: providing the Secretary of CMS with the
power
to
make
a
“conditional
payment”
under
§ 1395y(b)(2)(B)(i),199 ensuring repayment to the Medicare “Trust
Fund,” and providing a cause of action for the United States to
recover these payments and collect double damages.200 Similarly,
nothing within the provision establishing a private cause of
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See Elliott-Engel, supra note 11.
Compare In re Avandia Mktg., Sales Practices & Prods. Liab. Litig., 685 F.3d
353, 367 (3d Cir. 2012) (allowing MAOs to sue putative tortfeasors to recover
conditional payments), with Bio-Med. Applications of Tenn., Inc. v. Cent. States Se.
& Sw. Areas Health & Welfare Fund, 656 F.3d 277, 294 (6th Cir. 2011), cert.
dismissed, 132 S. Ct. 1087 (2012) (concluding that only Medicare, and not Medicare
beneficiaries could bring suit against putative tortfeasors under the MSP Act).
197
In re Avandia, 685 F.3d at 360.
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action provides any reference to reimbursement outside of
Medicare.201 Based upon textual analysis, courts have found that
the private cause of action provides Medicare beneficiaries with
the ability to sue and recover conditional payments, enforcing a
pro-government scheme.202
Reliance on regulations to confer a right to MAOs, which
Congress itself has not provided, is inappropriate. The Third
Circuit cited a federal regulation, which provides: “The MA
organization will exercise the same rights to recover from a
primary plan, entity, or individual that the Secretary exercises
under the MSP regulations . . . .”203 However, federal regulations
provide administrative guidance, and they cannot create a cause
of action where none exists.204 As written, the statute leaves far
too much doubt as to whether Congress intended to extend these
powerful rights of recovery to private insurers that pursue their
own money and not money paid from the Medicare Trust Fund.
Legislative history and case law also support limiting the
private cause of action. Congress established the MSP Act’s
private cause of action in 1986, before MAOs existed as a
substitute form of health coverage, indicating that, at the time,
Congress could have contemplated only the government’s
recovery of conditional payments.205 Also, the First and Eighth
Circuits have ruled that the private cause of action is not a qui
tam statute conferring a public right to sue on behalf of the
federal government.206 Instead, the courts limited the right to
those with standing and an established injury from the
nonforthcoming payments, rather than opening mass tort
litigation to unrelated plaintiffs.207 The Sixth Circuit suggested a
201
202

See id. § 1395y(b)(3)(A).
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*35 (citing Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 257, 291 (2001) (“[A] regulation may not
‘conjure up a private cause of action that has not been authorized by
Congress . . . .’ ”)).
205
Neuworth & Goldberg, supra note 61, at 38; see also Stalley v. Catholic
Health Initiatives, 509 F.3d 517, 524–25 (8th Cir. 2007). MAOs were created in
1997. See Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-33, 111 Stat. 251, 275–76
(1997).
206
See generally United Seniors Ass’n v. Philip Morris USA, 500 F.3d 19 (1st
Cir. 2007); Stalley, 509 F.3d at 517.
207
See generally United Seniors Ass’n, 500 F.3d at 19; Stalley, 509 F.3d at 517.
204

FINAL_PREVETE

2015]

10/7/2015 7:12 PM

DOUBLE DAMAGES OR NOTHING

261

further limitation based on primary payer liability, specifically
for putative tortfeasors.208 The Sixth Circuit implied that the
2003 amendment, expanding “primary payer” to include putative
tortfeasors, came with two limitations: only Medicare could
pursue tortfeasors under the MSP Act and only if it met the
demonstrated responsibility provision.209
Notably, although
there is conflict among the circuits as to the precise limitations
placed upon the MSP Act private cause of action, the Third
Circuit stands alone in its assertion that it extends to suits by
MAOs.
B.

Support from Policy for Limiting the Private Cause of Action

Despite any ambiguities in text or case law, public policy
justifies limiting the private cause of action. The costs within
mass tort litigation discourage the broadest interpretation of the
private cause of action. Putative tortfeasors, liable as primary
payers, face the threat of double damages.210 That threat directly
bears on these defendants’ willingness to settle with an injured
insured. With little congressional intent to support the change,
MAOs should resort to their traditional remedies in state courts.
In the context of complex mass tort litigation, expanding the
private right of action provides a right to sue for double damages
to hundreds of MAOs insuring thousands of people.211 Under the
MSP Act, these new plaintiffs have a federal tort remedy for
personal injury actions, an area traditionally left to state
courts.212 The expanded interpretation of the private cause of
action allows private insurers to enter federal courts in an
unprecedented manner. The cause of action provides a potential
windfall for private insurance companies because once an
insurance company makes a conditional payment, it may proceed
to recover this payment from a settling tortfeasor.213 There is a
strong incentive to pursue double damages against corporate
defendants that fail to timely reimburse MAOs. Thus, the
208

See generally Bio-Med. Applications of Tenn., Inc. v. Cent. States Se. & Sw.
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private cause of action no longer promotes efficiency and
government cost reduction; instead, it provides a method for
private insurers to recover. This interpretation does not serve
the original purpose of the MSP Act.214
In mass tort litigation, defendants must consider how
settlement will affect the outcome of later litigation, and the
MSP Act leads to even greater consequences. Generally, settling
a case for a large amount of money can create a norm for later
plaintiffs who pursue the same defendant.215 Under the MSP
Act, any large settlements may become the basis for a MAO’s
right to recover in the future.216 Under the MSP Act, defendants
who settle with beneficiaries are automatically liable as primary
plans.217 Suddenly, defendants are facing the possibility of
lawsuits from not only Medicare and Medicare beneficiaries but
also MAOs and their beneficiaries. These defendants must focus
on the future costs of settlement and the current exposure to both
governmental and private insurance entities that may potentially
pursue double damages.
Compounding the complications of expanded liability,
settling tortfeasors face practical issues in their efforts to
reimburse MAOs’ conditional payments. In comparison to the
data CMS provides on Medicare, the information pairing MAOs
with their claimants is not readily available.218 Under the MSP
Act, there is a sixty-day period for a primary plan to reimburse
the conditional payer before the government may pursue the
primary plan.219 Putative tortfeasors have no independent source
matching MA enrollees with their private insurers.220 Thus, the
settling defendant has limited ability to ensure timely
reimbursement for a potentially unrevealed lien and risks
exposure to double damages with every settlement.221
Without Congress’s clarification, extending the private cause
of action to MAOs creates a host of issues in exchange for few
benefits. Although the court in In re Avandia indicated the
214
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eventual savings to Medicare that occur when MAOs recover
their conditional payments efficiently,222 this minimal advantage
does not outweigh the risks of expansion. If Congress seeks to
provide MAOs with a private right of action, it would be
beneficial to also provide limitations. Additionally, Congress
should consider devising a method or database for defendants to
match
enrollees
with
their
MAOs,
preventing
late
reimbursement due to unknown liens. The double damages
recovery is a powerful tool, perhaps best used by the government
alone. Therefore, under the current state of the MSP Act, the
private cause of action should not apply to MAOs.
CONCLUSION
The MSP Act private cause of action should be construed
narrowly to exclude MAOs’ right to sue putative tortfeasors for
recovery of conditional payments. Congress enacted the MSP Act
and the private cause of action with one ultimate goal: help the
government recover conditional payments made on behalf of
Medicare enrollees. Allowing private insurer MAOs to assert the
same rights as the government subverts the purpose of the
statute, providing recovery to private insurers and not the
government. By finding a cause of action where Congress did not
explicitly provide one, the Third Circuit decision has left parties
with a looming threat to settlements in mass tort litigation. As
defendants face extensive and costly liability, the injured insured
parties are ultimately left with less compensation while the
government derives little of the statute’s intended benefits. In
the interest of preventing inefficiency in federal litigation, the
private cause of action should not be extended to MAOs.
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